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ADDENDUMS 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction in this matter before the Utah Court of Appeals is based upon Utah Code 
Ann. §78-2a-3(2)G). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Whether the trial court properly ruled that Ms. Pasquin's claim of Lifetime 
employment was void under the Statute of Frauds, or in the alternative, whether the trial court 
properly ruled that, as a matter of law, no reasonable jury could find a contract for employment 
for life based upon the record. 
In determining whether the trial court correctly ruled, the Appellate Court views the 
facts and all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. It 
reviews the trial court's conclusions of law for correctness. Blue Cross and Blue Shield v. State, 
779 P2d. 634 (Utah 1989). 
II. Whether the trial court properly granted the Pasquin-Quality Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment that Ms. Pasquin's claim of partnership in the business is barred by the 
Statute of Frauds. 
The same standard of review as set forth in |^ I above applies. In addition, a reviewing 
court may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any ground available to the trial court, even if 
it is one not relied on below. Higgins v. Salt Lake County, et al, 855 P2d 231 (Utah 1993). 
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III. Whether the trial court properly denied Ms. Pasquin's Motion to Reconsider the 
Entry of the Pasquin-Quality Defendants' Summary Judgment. 
The standard of review set forth in f I above applies. 
IV. Whether the trial court erred in denying Ms. Pasquin's Rule 56(f) motion. 
The standard of review set forth in f I above is applicable. 
RELEVANT LAW 
The following laws and rules are set forth in Addendum I: 
Utah Code Ann. §25-5-4—"certain agreements void unless written and signed" 
Utah Code Ann. §48-l-26--"dissolution defined" 
Rule 6, Utah R. Civ. Pro.—"Time" 
Rule 33, Utah R. Civ. Pro.—"Interrogatories to Parties" 
Rule 56(e), Utah R. Civ. Pro.—"Summary Judgment—Form of Affidavits" 
Rule 56(f), Utah R. Civ. Pro.—"When Affidavits are Unavailable" 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Ms. Pasquin brought this action seeking to establish an "employment for life" contract 
with the Pasquin-Quality Defendants, and an indeterminate "partnership interest" in the business 
of Quality Parts, which was formed by John and Kory Pasquin and funded by John Pasquin. Ms. 
Pasquin is the mother of Kory (who is deceased) and the former spouse of John. Geri and John 
are the parents of Kory. Geri brought this action after Kory was killed in an accident. 
The Court granted the Pasquin-Quality parties' Motion for Summary Judgment against 
Ms. Pasquin on the grounds that, based upon the record, no reasonable jury could find an 
"employment for life" contract and that Ms. Pasquin's partnership claims were barred under the 
Statute of Frauds. The Court also denied Ms. Pasquin's Motion for Reconsideration. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1990, John and Kory Pasquin formed Quality Parts, a partnership. All of the work and 
effort in the formation and development of the business was performed by John, Kory and 
Jimmie Pasquin and all risk capital was provided by John. The only partners were John and 
Kory at the time of organization and no others were anticipated. (R. 132.) 
In 1991, Kory asked John if they would hire Ms. Pasquin to perform receptionist duties, 
organize a file system and perform general secretarial work. At that time, Ms. Pasquin was 
unemployed and both John and Kory were assisting her in meeting her obligations. (Addendum 
2.) John agreed that Ms. Pasquin could come to work for the Company on an hourly basis as an 
independent contractor. (R. 132.) Shortly after beginning work, Ms. Pasquin quit, apparently 
because she believed she wasn't being paid enough. (Addendum 2.) Kory allowed Ms. Pasquin 
to return to work because of his concern for her. John, out of deference to Kory, allowed his ex-
wife, Ms. Pasquin, to return to work. John knew that Kory was concerned for his mother and 
that Kory wanted her to have a job as long as she wanted and was able to perform her duties. 
(Addendum 2.) John, on the other hand, was not pleased that Ms. Pasquin was working in the 
business, she being his ex-wife. Knowing, however, Kory's desire to provide employment for 
his mother, Ms. Pasquin, John agreed to allow Ms. Pasquin to retain her employment. (R. 132.) 
At no time did John acknowledge that there were any other partners in Quality Parts or 
any officers, directors and/or shareholders in the successor corporation, Quality Transport 
Refrigeration, Inc., other than John and Kory. (R. 132-133.) 
During the time the business was a partnership, for tax purposes, each year John and 
Kory were issued K-1 Forms (Partner's Share of Profits and Losses) and Ms. Pasquin was issued 
1099 Forms (Miscellaneous Income). (R. 133.) 
In 1996, John and Kory incorporated the partnership into a corporation, Quality Transport 
Refrigeration, Inc. After incorporation, Ms. Pasquin demanded to be paid as an employee rather 
than as an independent contractor. Kory requested that John consent to that arrangement and, 
although it would cost more to the business, John did consent based upon Kory's desire. (R. 
132.) 
Shortly after Kory's death in October, 1996, the parties met at the Duffin's office. At that 
meeting, John was informed by Julie Flarity (Ms. Pasquin's daughter from a prior marriage) that 
she was intent on making sure that Ms. Pasquin received her "fair share of the Company". At 
that meeting, John stated that he was aware of and would honor Kory's desire to provide 
employment for Ms. Pasquin as long as she could perform her duties. Shortly thereafter, John 
learned from her that she had obtained counsel. After being served with a Complaint, John 
became aware of Ms. Pasquin's claims. (Addendum 2.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Court correctly ruled that the partnership relationship as claimed by Ms. Pasquin was 
void under the Statute of Frauds. In the alternative, the Court's ruling implicitly recognizes that 
the alleged arrangement was, at best, a partnership at will which could be terminated, as to any 
so-called partner, by the dissolution as to any partner, caused by their withdrawal from the 
business. 
-4-
The trial court properly granted the Pasquin-Quality Parties' Motion for Summary 
Judgment regarding Ms. Pasquin's "lifetime employment" claim as violative of the Statute of 
Frauds or, in the alternative, as constituting employment for an indefinite duration and, therefore, 
terminable at will. 
The trial court correctly ruled that Ms. Pasquin's verification of mixed factual allegations 
and legal arguments set forth in her counsel's Memorandum in Opposition to the Pasquin-
Quality Parties' Motion for Summary Judgment was legally insufficient and that the Plaintiff 
was, therefore, resting on her pleadings. 
The trial court properly denied Ms. Pasquin's Motion for Reconsideration on the basis 
that the Pasquin-Quality Parties timely responded to her discovery requests. 
The trial court correctly denied Ms. Pasquin's Objection to the Pasquin-Quality Parties' 
Proposed Summary Judgment Order as being untimely. 
ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court Correctly Granted Pasquin-Quality's Motion for 
Summary Judgment Regarding Ms. Pasquin's "lifetime employment" Claim. 
The Pasquin-Quality Parties urged, in their Motion for Summary Judgment, that the 
employment claim of Ms. Pasquin be held unenforceable by virtue of the Statute of Frauds, 
U.C.A. §25-5-4. Because all of Ms. Pasquin's employment claims regarding the Pasquin-Quality 
Parties are based upon supposed oral conversations and representations between Ms. Pasquin and 
the late Kory Pasquin, the safeguard of the Statute of Frauds should be rigorously applied to this 
matter. If this Court holds that Ms. Pasquin's employment is for "lifetime", the Court would 
hold that the duration of the employment is for a fixed period. If so, such an agreement would be 
subject to the Statute of Frauds and, if the agreement is oral, it is void. 
The Pasquin-Quality Summary Judgment was, however, also based upon the grounds that 
Ms. Pasquin is, at best, an employee at-will and nothing more. The Court grounded its 
conclusion on the basis that, as a matter of law, no reasonable jury could find an implied contract 
under the facts and circumstances of this matter sufficient to justify altering the at-will 
employment presumption. 
Ms. Pasquin has provided no written agreement, memorandum, handbook or personnel 
policy issued by Pasquin-Quality which could be deemed to have constituted the formation of a 
contract, whether implied in fact or express, between them and Ms. Pasquin. Nonetheless, the 
Plaintiff alleges that she has been employed for life ".. .unless she chose otherwise...", and that 
".. .there was not even a requirement that she be physically capable of working for the 
business...". (R.4.) Ms. Pasquin appears to be alleging an implied-in-fact employment contract. 
As stated above, as to the lawful formation of a contract, a court possesses the power to 
decide, as a matter of law, whether a reasonable jury could find an implied contract under the 
facts and circumstances of a matter. See, e.g., Sanderson v. First Security Leasing Co., 844 P.2d 
303 (Utah 1992); and Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49 (Utah 1991). If a reasonable jury 
cannot find that an implied contract exists, summary judgment is appropriate. Caldwell v. Ford, 
Bacon and Davis Utah, Inc., Ill P.2d 483 (Utah 1989). Further, an employee has the burden of 
establishing the existence of any implied-in-fact contract provision, that is, the employee must 
show that although there was no express contract provision to this effect, the parties nevertheless 
agreed that employment would not be at-will. Johnson v. Morton-Thiokol Inc., 818 P.2d 997 
(Utah 1991). 
Ms. Pasquin argues that the allegations of her Complaint which were incorporated into 
her Memorandum in Opposition to the Pasquin-Quality Motion for Summary Judgment, which 
memorandum was then "verified" by Ms. Pasquin, constitutes compliance with Rule 56(e) Utah 
R. Civ. Pro. It appears, however, that all Ms. Pasquin has put forth are conclusory statements 
and objectionable hearsay testimony which are insufficient to rebut the Pasquin-Quality Motion 
for Summary Judgment. See, e.g., Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857 (Utah 1983): and Western 
States Thrift and Loan v. Blomquist, 504 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1972). Nonetheless, Ms. Pasquin 
argues that this somehow constitutes the equivalent of an affidavit in opposition to the Pasquin-
Quality Motion for Summary Judgment. Even so, it is well settled that in order for an affidavit 
to be effective in the determination of a motion for summary judgment, it must set forth such 
facts as would be admissible in evidence. Preston v. Lamb, 436 P.2d 1021 (Utah 1968). Ms. 
Pasquin's Memorandum in Opposition to the Pasquin-Quality Motion for Summary Judgment 
reads very much like her Complaint; that is, it contains conclusory allegations with, literally, no 
foundational basis to support her assertions. Essentially, she argues that her deceased son, Kory, 
made substantial and meaningful representations to her while he was alive with the claimed 
express consent of John. (R. 155-162.) John Pasquin has, however, in his affidavit appended to 
his Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 131-133) reiterated his denial in his Answer that he never 
so consented. Does this create an ostensible issue of fact? It shouldn't. 
Along with Ms. Pasquin's allegations of a lifetime employment contract, she also alleges 
that she wasn't required to be physically capable of working in order to sustain her lifetime 
employment contract. (R. 4.) To reiterate Sanderson v. First Security Leasing Co., infra, a court 
has the power to decide whether, as a matter of law, a reasonable jury could find that an implied 
contract exists under the circumstances. In this matter, the trial court held that no reasonable jury 
could. (R. 188.) 
Further, Ms. Pasquin argues that the Pasquin-Quality Parties have "admitted" to the 
lifetime employment agreement by citing one answer to an interrogatory propounded by her to 
Pasquin-Quality. (Addendum 2.) The essence of that answer is that, upon Kory's urging, John 
agreed to hire Ms. Pasquin approximately one year after the business was founded because, at 
that time, Ms. Pasquin was unemployed and both John and Kory were assisting her in meeting 
her obligations. At that time, Kory had expressed concern for his mother and desired to have a 
job available for her as long as she wanted it and was able to work. (Addendum 2.) But, John 
clearly stated under oath in his affidavit to the Pasquin-Quality Motion for Summary Judgment 
that the employment relationship was based on Kory's concern for Ms. Pasquin and that John 
would simply do what he could to honor Kory's concern. The issue, then, is whether a 
reasonable jury could find a contract for lifetime employment or whether, based upon the record 
herein, John has become indeterminately connected to his ex-spouse, Geri. 
Finally, shortly after commencing her duties with Pasquin-Quality, Ms. Pasquin quit, 
complaining of not being paid enough. (Addendum 2.)1 If Ms. Pasquin had a lifetime 
employment agreement, she breached that agreement on at least one occasion (Addendum 2), 
thereby terminating that agreement. Any subsequent employment relationship would be clearly 
at will. 
1
 Although not in the record, should this matter be remanded, John will state that Geri quit many times but, because 
of Kory, was allowed to return to work. 
The Trial Court Properly Granted Pasquin-Quality's Motion for 
Summary Judgment Regarding Ms. Pasquin's Partnership Claim. 
The trial court granted the Pasquin-Quality Motion for Summary Judgment regarding Ms. 
Pasquin's partnership claim on the grounds that it was violative of the Statute of Frauds, U.CA. 
§25-5-4. At the time Pasquin-Quality submitted their Motion, the trial court had already granted 
the Motion for Summary Judgment on behalf of Kory's Estate. (R. 76-78.) Pasquin-Quality 
concede that it is difficult to determine, from the record as constituted, what parameters Ms. 
Pasquin claims with regard to her partnership claim, such as a time specified for its continuance. 
The issue, then, becomes one of the nature of this so-called partnership. 
As a general rule, and in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, an oral agreement 
claimed to establish a partnership relationship is one at-will. That is, a partnership at-will may 
be dissolved by the will of any partner when no definite term or particular undertaking is 
specified without violation of the agreement between the partners. Nicholes v. Hunt, 541 P.2d 
820 (Oregon 1975). See also Wester and Co. v. Nestle, 669 P.2d 1046 (Colorado 1983). 
Thus, Ms. Pasquin's partnership claim is, at best, determinable at-will. The consequences 
of this purported partnership arrangement as discussed herein are adequately reflected in the 
record. This Court may consider any ground available to affirm summary judgment even if the 
ground was not relied upon by the Court below, if there is some support in the record. Higgins v. 
Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231 (Utah 1993). 
Assuming that a partnership at-will existed between Ms. Pasquin and Pasquin-Quality 
(and Kory), Ms. Pasquin quit very early on after the purported formation of this partnership at-
will. That act (along with any subsequent terminations of participation) acted to dissolve Ms. 
Pasquin's participation, if any, in the purported partnership. U.C.A. §48-1-26 defines dissolution 
of a partnership as the ".. .change in the relation of the partners caused by any partner ceasing to 
be associated in the carrying on... of the business). Under £/.CA§48-l-28, dissolution is caused 
by, among others, the express will of any partner. Of course, any remaining partners are free to 
continue the business. As stated in Graham v. Street, 270 P.2d 456 (Utah 1954): 
...[§] 48-1-28 establishes in each partner and indefeasible 
right to dissolve the partnership even where the partners 
covenant that the partnership will continue for a number of 
years, the only consequence being that in a partnership for a 
definite term the dissolving partner subjects himself to a 
claim for damages for breach of a contract and for an 
accounting. [Citation omitted.] This being so in a 
partnership for a definite term, a fortiori in a partnership at 
will, where an accounting must be the exclusive remedy 
since no contract has been breached. 
By quitting her relationship with Pasquin-Quality and Kory on at least one occasion, it is clear 
that she dissolved whatever relationship she thought she had with them at that time. 
Even more telling, however, is the tax treatment accorded Ms. Pasquin and John and 
Kory. Ms. Pasquin was initially hired as an independent contractor to perform general secretarial 
work at the business. (R. 132.) After incorporation of the business, Ms. Pasquin demanded to be 
paid as an employee rather than an independent contractor. (R. 132.) During the time she was an 
independent contractor, she was issued Forms 1099 (Miscellaneous Income) and, later Forms W-
2. On the other hand, John and Kory were issued Forms K-l (Partner's Share of Profits and 
Losses). (R. 133.) This Court has held that the tax treatment of persons in a business 
relationship is a pertinent factor in determining the existence of a partnership and, therefore (by 
implication) who the partners are. See West One Trust Co. v. Morrison, 861 P.2d 1058 (Utah 
app. 1993). 
Based upon the record and the law, it is reasonable for this Court to hold that no 
reasonable jury could find in favor of Ms. Pasquin on her claims of partnership with Pasquin-
Quality and Kory. 
The Trial Court Properly Denied Ms. Pasquin's Motion to 
Reconsider Entry of the Pasquin-Quality Summary Judgment. 
Ms. Pasquin argues that the trial court's denial of her Motion to Reconsider the Pasquin-
Quality Summary Judgment based upon the objection being untimely under Rule 4-504(2), 
U.K. J.A. While it is doubtful, based upon the record, that the Court would have ruled in her 
favor upon reconsideration, the issue of timeliness is, nonetheless, interesting. 
Rule 6(a), Utah R. Civ. Pro. deals with computing "period(s) of time prescribed" and 
states that when a prescribed period is less than seven (7) days, intermediate weekends and 
holidays are excluded. Rule 6(e), Utah R. Civ. Pro., states that when a person is required to take 
some action within a prescribed period after service of notice and the notice is mailed, three (3) 
days shall be added to the "prescribed period". 
Pasquin-Quality contend that if three (3) days are added to a "prescribed period" of five 
(5) days under Rule 4-501, the "prescribed period" becomes eight (8) days, which, thus, removes 
it from operation of Rule 6(a). Therefore, weekends and holidays would be counted in the 
"prescribed period" of eight (8) days. 
The proposed Order of Summary Judgment for Pasquin-Quality was mailed on October 
23, 1997 (Thursday). Upon the foregoing analysis, therefore, Ms. Pasquin's Motion for 
Reconsideration would have been due on October 31,1997 (Friday). She didn't file her motion 
until November 3, 1997 (Tuesday), or 12 days after service of the Proposed Order of Summary 
Judgment from Pasquin-Quality. Thus, the trial court correctly ruled that her Motion for 
Reconsideration was untimely. 
The Trial Court Correctly Denied Ms. Pasquin's Rule 56(f) Motion. 
In response to two (2) sets of interrogatories propounded by Ms. Pasquin on Pasquin-
Quality, responses to those interrogatories were timely filed by Pasquin-Quality pursuant to Rule 
33, Utah R. Civ. Pro. (Addendum 3.) Further, under Rule 33(c), Utah R. Civ. Pro., Pasquin-
Quality responded to many of the interrogatories and the Requests for Production by specifying 
that the items requested could be ascertained from the business records of Pasquin-Quality and 
that such records would be produced pursuant to Rule 33(c).2 
It is correct that depositions scheduled in this matter were postponed due to an injury 
suffered by John, resulting in concussion and hemorrhaging in John's brain. On June 3, 1997, 
counsel for Pasquin-Quality corresponded with counsel for Ms. Pasquin regarding the status of 
John at that time and requesting that the parties move forward with depositions on all other 
parties as previously scheduled and requested confirmation in this regard. (R. 141.) Counsel for 
Pasquin-Quality received no further inquiry from Ms. Pasquin's counsel regarding inspection of 
the business records or of continuing discovery of the other parties while John recuperated. 
Ms. Pasquin urges that she was unable to complete her discovery prior to the rulings on 
summary judgment. But, not only did she not follow-up on requesting "reasonable opportunity" 
(Rule 33(c), Utah R. Civ. Pro.) to examine the business records which were available, she did not 
make any effort to determine the availability of John or other Defendants for purposes of 
2
 Although not reflected in the record, the documents were delivered to Pasquin-Quality's counsel's office. 
depositions prior to the filing of the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. It is not the 
responsibility of counsel for those Defendants to arrange Ms. Pasquin's discovery schedule. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Pasquin-Quality requests that this Court affirm the rulings of 
the trial court in all respects regarding Pasquin-Quality. 
DATED this J_ day of December, 1998. 
/J/ 
Steven L. Taylor 
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ADDENDUM 1 
1 
25-5-4. Certain agreements void unless written and signed. 
The following agreements are void unless the agreement, or some note or memorandum of the 
agreement, is in writing, signed by the party to be charged with the agreement: 
(1) every agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within one year from the making 
of the agreement; 
(2) every promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another; 
48-1-26. "Dissolution" defined. 
The dissolution of a partnership is the change in the relation of the partners caused by any 
partner ceasing to be associated in the carrying on, as distinguished from the winding up, of the 
business. 
48-1-28. Causes of dissolution. 
Dissolution is caused: 
(1) Without violation of the agreement between the partners: 
(a) By the termination of the definite term or particular undertaking specified in the 
agreement. 
(b) By the express will of any partner when no definite term or particular undertaking is 
specified. 
(c) By the express will of all the partners who have not assigned their interests, or suffered 
them to be charged for their separate debts, either before or after the termination of any specified 
term or particular undertaking. 
(d) By the expulsion of any partner from the business bona fide in accordance with such a 
power conferred by the agreement between the partners. 
(2) In contravention of the agreement between the partners, where the circumstances do not 
permit a dissolution under any other provision of this section, by the express will of any partner at 
any time. 
(3) By any event which makes it unlawful for the business of the partnership to be carried on 
or for the members to carry it on in partnership. 
(4) By the death of any partner. 
(5) By the bankruptcy of any partner or the partnership. 
(6) By decree of court under Section 48-1-29. 
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Rule 33. Interrogatories to parties. 
(a) Availability; procedures for use. Any party may serve upon any other party written 
interrogatories to be answered by the party served or, if the party served is a public or private 
corporation, a partnership, an association, or a governmental agency, by any officer or agent, who 
shall furnish such information as is available to the party. Interrogatories may, without leave of 
court, be served upon the plaintiff after commencement of the action and upon any other party 
with or after service of the summons and complaint upon that party. 
Each interrogatory shall be answered separately and fully in writing under oath, unless it is 
objected to, in which event the reasons for objection shall be stated in lieu of an answer. The 
answers are to be signed by the person making them, and the objections signed by the attorney 
making them. The party upon whom the interrogatories have been served shall serve a copy of the 
answers and objections, if any, within 30 days after the service of the interrogatories, except that a 
defendant may serve answers or objections within 45 days after service of the summons and 
complaint upon that defendant. The court may allow a shorter or longer time. The party 
submitting the interrogatories may move for an order under Rule 37(a) with respect to any 
objection to or other failure to answer an interrogatory. 
(b) Scope; use at trial Interrogatories may relate to any matters which can be inquired into 
under Rule 26(b), and the answers may be used to the extent permitted by the Rules of Evidence. 
An interrogatory otherwise proper is not necessarily objectionable merely because an answer 
to the interrogatory involves an opinion or contention that relates to fact or the application of law 
to fact, but the court may order that such an interrogatory need not be answered until after 
designated discovery has been completed or until a pretrial conference or other later time. 
(c) Option to produce business records. Where the answer to an interrogatory may be 
derived or ascertained from the business records of the party upon whom the interrogatory has 
been served or from an examination, audit, or inspection of such business records, including a 
compilation, abstract, or summary thereof and the burden of deriving or ascertaining the answer is 
substantially the same for the party serving the interrogatory as for the party served, it is a 
sufficient answer to such interrogatory to specify the records from which the answer may be 
derived or ascertained and to afford to the party serving the interrogatory reasonable opportunity 
to examine, audit, or inspect such records and to make copies, compilations, abstracts, or 
summaries. A specification shall be in sufficient detail to permit the interrogating party to locate 
and to identify, as readily as can the party served, the records from which the answer may be 
ascertained. 
(c) 1998 by LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All Ri^rts Reserved 
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Rule 6. Time. 
(a) Computation. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these rules, by 
the local rules of any district court, by order of court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the 
act, event, or default from which the designated period of time begins to run shall not be included 
The last day of the period so computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a 
legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the next day which is not a Saturday, 
a Sunday, or a legal holiday When the period of time prescribed or allowed is less than seven 
days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation 
(b) Enlargement When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of the 
court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the court for cause 
shown may at any time in its discretion (1) with or without motion or notice order the period 
enlarged if request therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as 
extended by a previous order or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of the specified period 
permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect, but it may 
not extend the time for taking any action under Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), 60(b) and 
73(a) and (g), except to the extent and under the conditions stated in them 
(c) Unaffected by expiration of term. The period of time provided for the doing of any act or 
the taking of any proceeding is not affected or limited by the continued existence or expiration of 
a term of court The continued existence or expiration of a term of court in no way affects the 
power of a court to do any act or take any proceeding in any civil action which has been pending 
before it 
(d) For motions - Affidavits. A written motion, other than one which may be heard ex parte, 
and notice of the hearing thereof shall be served not later than 5 days before the time specified for 
the hearing, unless a different period is fixed by these rules, by CJA 4-501, or by order of the 
court Such an order may for cause shown be made on ex parte application When a motion is 
supported by affidavit, the affidavit shall be served with the motion, and, except as otherwise 
provided in Rule 59(c), opposing affidavits may be served not later than 1 day before the hearing, 
unless the court permits them to be served at some other time 
(e) Additional time after service by mail. Whenever a party has the right or is required to do 
some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period after the service of a notice or 
other paper upon him and the notice or paper is served upon him by mail, 3 days shall be added to 
the prescribed period 
(c) 1998 by LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc All Rigrts Reserved 
RULE 56 SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing 
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible 
in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters 
stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit 
shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented 
or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for 
summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest 
upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If 
he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing 
the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his 
opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to 
permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make 
such other order as is just. 
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Rule 4-501. Motions. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for filing motions, supporting memoranda and documents 
with the court. 
To establish a uniform procedure for requesting and scheduling hearings on dispositive 
motions. 
To establish a procedure for expedited dispositions. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all district courts except proceedings before the 
court commissioners and small claims cases. This rule does not apply to petitions for habeas 
corpus or other forms of extraordinary relief. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Filing and service of motions and memoranda, 
(A) Motion and supporting memoranda. All motions, except uncontested or ex-parte 
matters, shall be accompanied by a memorandum of points and authorities appropriate affidavits, 
and copies of or citations by page number to relevant portions of depositions, exhibits or other 
documents relied upon in support of the motion. Memoranda supporting or opposing a motion 
shall not exceed ten pages in length exclusive of the "statement of material facts" as provided in 
paragraph (2), except as waived by order of the court on ex-parte application. If an ex-parte 
application is made to file an over-length memorandum, the application shall state the length of 
the principal memorandum, and if the memorandum is in excess often pages, the application shall 
include a summary of the memorandum, not to exceed five pages. 
(B) Memorandum in opposition to motion. The responding party shall file and serve upon all 
parties within ten days after service of a motion, a memorandum in opposition to the motion, and 
all supporting documentation. If the responding party fails to file a memorandum in opposition to 
the motion within ten days after service of the motion, the moving party may notify the clerk to 
submit the matter to the court for decision as provided in paragraph (l)(d) of this rule. 
(C) Reply memorandum. The moving party may serve and file a reply memorandum within 
five days after service of the responding party's memorandum. 
(D) Notice to submit for decision. Upon the expiration of the five-day period to file a reply 
memorandum, either party may notify the Clerk to submit the matter to the court for decision. 
The notification shall be in the form of a separate written pleading and captioned "Notice to 
Submit for Decision." The notification shall contain a certificate of mailing to all parties. If neither 
party files a notice, the motion will not be submitted for decision. 
(2) Motions for summary judgment, 
(A) Memorandum in support of a motion. The points and authorities in support of a motion 
for summary judgment shall begin with a section that contains a concise statement of material 
facts as to which movant contends no genuine issue exists. The facts shall be stated in separate 
numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of the record upon which the 
movant relies. 
(B) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and authorities in opposition to a 
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motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that contains a concise statement of 
material facts as to which the party contends a genuine issue exists. Each disputed fact shall be 
stated in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of the record 
upon which the opposing party relies, and, if applicable, shall state the numbered sentence or 
sentences of the movant's facts that are disputed. All material facts set forth in the movant's 
statement and properly supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be deemed admitted 
for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the opposing party's 
statement. 
(3) Hearings. 
(A) A decision on a motion shall be rendered without a hearing unless ordered by the Court, 
or requested by the parties as provided in paragraphs (3)(b) or (4) below. 
(B) In cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the action or any issues in the 
action on the merits with prejudice, either party at the time of filing the principal memorandum in 
support of or in opposition to a motion may file a written request for a hearing. 
(C) Such request shall be granted unless the court finds that (a) the motion or opposition to 
the motion is frivolous or (b) that the dispositive issue or set of issues governing the granting or 
denial of the motion has been authoritatively decided. 
(D) When a request for hearing is denied, the court shall notify the requesting party. When a 
request for hearing is granted, the court shall set the matter for hearing or notify the requesting 
party that the matter shall be heard and the requesting party shall schedule the matter for hearing 
and notify all parties of the date and time. 
(E) In those cases where a hearing is granted, a courtesy copy of the motion, memorandum of 
points and authorities and all documents supporting or opposing the motion shall be delivered to 
the judge hearing the matter at least two working days before the date set for hearing. Copies 
shall be clearly marked as courtesy copies and indicate the date and time of the hearing. Courtesy 
copies shall not be filed with the clerk of the court. 
(F) If no written request for a hearing is made at the time the parties file their principal 
memoranda, a hearing on the motion shall be deemed waived. 
(G) All dispositive motions shall be heard at least thirty (30) days before the scheduled trial 
date. No dispositive motions shall be heard after that date without leave of the Court. 
(4) Expedited dispositions. Upon motion and notice and for good cause shown, the court 
may grant a request for an expedited disposition in any case where time is of the essence and 
compliance with the provisions of this rule would be impracticable or where the motion does not 
raise significant legal issues and could be resolved summarily. 
(5) Telephone conference. The court on its own motion or at a party's request may direct 
arguments of any motion by telephone conference without court appearance. A verbatim record 
shall be made of all telephone arguments and the rulings thereon if requested by counsel. 
(c) 1998 by LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All Rigrts Reserved. 
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Rule 4-504. Written orders, judgments and decrees. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for submitting written orders, judgments, and decrees to the 
court. This rule is not intended to change existing law with respect to the enforceability of 
unwritten agreements. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all civil proceedings in courts of record except small claims. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) In all rulings by a court, counsel for the party or parties obtaining the ruling shall within 
fifteen days, or within a shorter time as the court may direct, file with the court a proposed order, 
judgment, or decree in conformity with the ruling. 
(2) Copies of the proposed findings, judgments, and orders shall be served upon opposing 
counsel before being presented to the court for signature unless the court otherwise orders. 
Notice of objections shall be submitted to the court and counsel within five days after service. 
(c) 1998 by LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All Rigits Reserved 
ADDENDUM 2 
STEVEN L. TAYLOR (#3210) 
124 South 600 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 533-8505 
Attorney for John Pasquin, Jimmie Pasguin, Quality Parts, and 
Quality Transport Refrigeration Parts, Inc. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GERI PASQUIN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN PASQUIN; JIMMIE PASQUIN; 
THE ESTATE OF KORY PASQUIN; 
QUALITY PARTS, a Utah general 
partnership; QUALITY TRANSPORT 
REFRIGERATION PARTS, INC.; 
THOMAS A. DUFFIN; DANIEL 
O. DUFFIN; DOES 1-40, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANTS' JOHN PASQUIN 
JIMMIE PASQUIN, QUALITY PARTS, 
a Utah General Partnership, 
and QUALITY TRANSPORT REFRIG-
ERATION PARTS, INC., ANSWERS 
TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES, REQUESTS FOR 
ADMISSION, & REQUEST 
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
Civil No. 970900011 CV 
JUDGE J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
Pursuant to 33 URCP, Defendants John Pasquin, Jimmie 
Pasguin, Quality Parts, and Quality Transport Refrigeration Parts, 
Inc. ("Defendants") serve the following Answers t o 
Interrogatories, Requests for Admissions, and Request for 
Production on Plaintiff. 
ANSWERS TO FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES 
1. Identify each person, other than counsel, who 
participated in the preparation of your answers to these 
Interrogatories. 
ANSWER 1.: John Pasquin and Jimmy Pasquin. 
7. Please state with particularity and detail each and every 
communication between you and the plaintiff(s), and each of them, 
relating to the subject matter of this suit; and with regard to 
each such communication, identify: 
(a) the date of such communication, 
(b) whether the communication was made by telephone, mail 
or in person, 
(c) the names of all parties involved in the communication, 
(d) the substance of each communication, and 
(e) describe each communication which was reduced to 
writing by identifying such document. 
ANSWER 7.: Approximately one (1) year after the predecessor 
partnership was formed in 1990 by John and Kory Pasquin, John 
agreed with Kory to hire Plaintiff as an independent contractor to 
perform receptionist duties, organize a file system and perform 
general secretarial work. Plaintiff commenced working in or about 
August 1991. At the time, John Pasquin was assisting Plaintiff on 
meeting her monthly household obligations inasmuch as Plaintiff was 
unemployed. Shortly after commencing her duties, the Plaintiff 
quit, complaining that she was not being paid enough. John and 
Kory Pasquin allowed her to return to work, primarily, to John's 
knowledge, because of Kory's concern for his mother, the Plaintiff. 
John is aware that Kory, out of that concern, would assist 
Plaintiff as much as he could in order to assure that Plaintiff 
would have employment with the Defendants' business as long as 
Plaintiff so desired and was able to perform her duties. 
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2. Admit that you breached the terms of said agreements as 
alleged in plaintiff(s)' complaint. 
RESPONSE 2.: Denied. 
3. Admit that you engaged in the wrongful conduct alleged 
to have been perpetrated by you in plaintiff(s)' complaint. 
RESPONSE 3.: Denied. 
4. Admit that the factual allegations contained in 
plaintiff(s)' complaint are true and correct in their entirety. 
RESPONSE 4.: Denied. 
5. Admit that plaintiff(s) are entitled to the relief 
sought against the defendant(s) in the complaint herein. 
RESPONSE 5.: Denied. 
6. Admit that the defendants are each jointly and severally 
liable to the plaintiff (s) for the amounts set forth in the prayer 
for relief in the complaint herein. 
RESPONSE 6.: Denied 
7. Admit that you have no defenses, counterclaims or 
setoffs against the plaintiff(s) and/or the amounts owed by you to 
the plaintiff(s) pursuant to the claims for relief in the 
complaint on file. 
RESPONSE 7.: Denied. 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION 
Please produce for inspection and copying by counsel for the 
plaintiff(s) the following documents within thirty (30) days of 
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service for this request upon you as required under the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure: 
1. All documents identified by you in your answers to the 
foregoing Interrogatories. 
RESPONSE 1.: As stated in Interrogatories, Defendants will produce 
documents in accordance with Rule 33(c) URCP. 
2. All documents relating or referring in any way to the 
subject matter of this litigation. 
RESPONSE 2.1 As stated in Interrogatories, Defendants will produce 
documents in accordance with Rule 33(c) URCP. 
DATED this day of April, 1997. 
John Pasquin, Jimmie Pasquin, 
Quality Parts, and Quality 
Transport Refrigeration Parts, Inc. 
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VERIFICATION 
State of Utah ) 
) ss. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
The undersigned JOHN PASQUIN being first duly sworn and under 
oath, deposes and says the following: 
I have read the foregoing Answers to Interrogatories and 
responses to Production of Documents, and the same are true and 
correct based on my personal knowledge and belief, and to the best 
of my knowledge and belief. 
DATED this day of April, 1997. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me thi 
day of April, 1997, by JOHN PASQUIN. . 
I \ . » ML MABEY | ^-- / r o t a r y 
8 o,if2,1;? ,5**» Drive • '-y 
* - Sy ,* '^2S!* , ,?2&P&»* * 
L ^tr S^eptember J6 1&97 • 
~ - = . ^ ^teofUteh ' 
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VERIFICATION 
Sta te of Utah 
County of Salt Lake 
) ss, 
) 
The undersigned JIMMIE PASQUIN being first duly sworn and under 
oath, deposes and says the following: 
I have read the foregoing Answers to Interrogatories and 
responses to Production of Documents, and the same are true and 
correct based on my personal knowledge and belief, and to the best 
of my knowledge and belief. 
DATED this Q^fr day of April, 1997. \ _-\-
STATE OF UTAH 
) ss. 
V-Mg5 
E $ASQU|N 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me thi 
day of April, 1997, by JIMMIE PASQUIN. 
is,<UZ^ 
i < 
i 
Notary Public • 
JAM13 M. M.A2EY I 
\ , e i 2iS5LakeiirO':T 3 | 
V H Salt Lake City, U ^ :; ' :3 J 
J/-I Mv Commission E *:a • 
September 13, 1.^7 | 
State of Utah • 
/ ^ r d £ 
r / 
axy 
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ADDENDUM 3 
STEVEN L. TAYLOR (#3210) 
124 South 600 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 533-8505 
Attorney for John Pasquin, Jixnmie Pasquin, Quality Parts, and 
Quality Transport Refrigeration Parts, Inc. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
GERI PASQUIN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN PASQUIN; JIMMIE PASQUIN; 
THE ESTATE OF KORY PASQUIN; 
QUALITY PARTS, a Utah general 
partnership; QUALITY TRANSPORT 
REFRIGERATION PARTS, INC.; 
THOMAS A. DUFFIN; DANIEL 
O. DUFFIN; DOES 1-40, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANTS' JOHN PASQUIN 
JIMMIE PASQUIN, QUALITY PARTS, 
a Utah General Partnership, 
and QUALITY TRANSPORT REFRIG-
ERATION PARTS, INC., ANSWERS 
TO PLAINTIFF'S SECOND SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES, REQUESTS FOR 
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
Civil No. 970900011 CV 
JUDGE J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
Pursuant to 33 URCP, Defendants John Pasquin, Jimmie 
Pasquin, Quality Parts, and Quality Transport Refrigeration Parts, 
Inc. ("Defendants") serve the following Answers to Interrogatories, 
and Request for Production on Plaintiff. 
ANSWERS TO SECOND SET OF INTERROGATORIES 
1. Identify all records of your income from Quality Parts 
or Quality Transport Refrigeration Parts, Inc., or from any other 
source, from 19.91 to the present. 
ANSWER 1.: Defendants will answer this Interrogatory by 
producing documents under Rule 33(c) URCP. 
2. Identify all property owned or acquired by Quality Parts 
or Quality Transport Refrigeration, Inc., which was transferred to 
or used by you at any time from 1991 to the present. 
ANSWER 2.: Defendants will answer this Interrogatory by 
producing documents under Rule 33(c) URCP. 
3. Identify all property owned by Kory Pasquin at his death 
that you now own, possess or use. 
ANSWER 3.: Defendants will answer this Interrogatory by 
producing documents under Rule 33(c) URCP. 
5. [sic] Identify all your tax returns from 1991 to the 
present. 
ANSWER 5. [sic] Defendants will answer this Interrogatory by 
producing documents under Rule 33(c) URCP. 
6. [sic] Identify all your bank accounts from 1991 to the 
present. 
ANSWER 6. [sic]: Defendants will answer this Interrogatory by 
producing documents under Rule 33(c) URCP. 
7. [sic] Identify all your financial records from 1991 to 
the present. 
ANSWER 7. [sic]: Defendants will answer this Interrogatory by 
producing documents under Rule 33(c) URCP. 
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REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION 
Please produce for inspection and copying by counsel for the 
plaintiff(s) the following documents within thirty (3 0) days of 
seirvice for this request upon you as required under the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure: 
1. All documents identified by you in your answers to the 
foregoing Interrogatories. 
RESPONSE 1.: As stated in Interrogatories, Defendants will produce 
documents in accordance with Rule 33(c) URCP. 
2. All documents relating or referring in any way to the 
subject matter of this litigation. 
RESPONSE 2. : As stated in Interrogatories, Defendants will produce 
documents in accordance with Rule 33(c) URCP. 
DATED this *- ' day of April, 1997. 
STEVEN L. TAYZfOR 
Attorneys for^D^rendants 
John Pasquin, Jimmie Pasquin, 
Quality Parts, and Quality 
Transport Refrigeration Parts, Inc. 
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VERIFICATION 
State of Utah ) 
) ss. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
The undersigned JOHN PASQUIN being first duly sworn and under 
oath, deposes and says the following: 
I have read the foregoing Answers to Interrogatories and 
responses to Production of Documents, and the same are true and 
correct based on my personal knowledge and belief, and to the best 
of my knowledge and belief. 
DATED this day of April, 1997. 
JOHN PASQUIN J] 
I 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) SS. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me thisc?£i__ 
day of April, 1997, by JOHN PASQUIN. 
, . _ xssaer J 
L « - ^ ^ T ^ _ _ « . State of Utah I 
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VERIFICATION 
S t a t e o f U t a h 
County o f S a l t Lake 
) ss. 
) 
The undersigned JIMMIE PASQUIN being first duly sworn and under 
oath, deposes and says the following: 
I have read the foregoing Answers to Interrogatories and 
responses to Production of Documents, and the same are true and 
correct based on my personal knowledge and belief, and to the best 
of my knowledge and belief. 
DATED this day of April, 1997. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss, 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me thisC^ / 
day of April, 1997, by JIMMIE PASQUIN. 
.Notary Public T 
JANIS M. MABEY I 
^ 2155 LakeOne Drive i 
SaJt Lake City, Utah 84103 J 
My Commission Empires • 
September 16,1997 I 
StateofUtah j 
SLT a:pasquin\interrog.2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing DEFENDANTS' JOHN PASQUIN, JIMMIE PASQUIN, QUALITY PARTS, 
a Utah General Partnership, and QUALITY TRANSPORT REFRIGERATION 
PARTS, INC., ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S SECOND SET OF INTERROGATORIES, 
& REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS through the U.S. Mails, 
postage prepaid to the following parties: 
Brian W. Steffensen 
Attorney for Plaintiff Geri Pasquin 
675 East 2100 South, Suite 350 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Carmen E. Kipp 
Kipp & Christian 
Attorney for Defendants 
Thomas A. Duffin 
Daniel O. Duffin 
175 East 400 South, Suite 330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Robert H. Copier 
Attorney Defendant for The Estate of Kory Pasquin 
234 East 400 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
DATED this c^^fday of April, 1997 
) 
y 
k, -M JL /-,.„ \ 
rarfFi^ M 
SLT a:\Pasquin\interrog.2 
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